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Abstract
A minimal model of a market of myopic non-cooperative agents
who trade bilaterally with random bids reproduces qualitative features
of short-term electric power markets, such as those in California and
New England. Each agent knows its own budget and preferences but
not those of any other agent. The near-equilibrium price established
mid-way through the trading session diverges to both much higher and
much lower prices towards the end of the trading session. This price
divergence emerges in the model without any possibility that the agents
could have conspired to “game” the market. The results were weakly
sensitive to the endowments but strongly sensitive to the nature of the
agent’s preferences and budget constraints.
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1 Introduction
The price evolution in markets for short-term electric power (Figure 1) con-
trasts with the textbook examples of two-good market, wherein price fluc-
tuations rapidly diminish as they settle down to an equilibrium price[PR01,
GS93]. In the short-term power market the price fluctuations may increase
dramatically towards the end of the trading session, resulting in both high
and low prices that can be many standard deviations from the mean price
set earlier in the session. This phenomenon could be plausibly attributed to
a variety of factors, e.g., the inelasticity of supply and demand or the struc-
ture of the market, that impute to the agents extensive market knowledge
and strategic skills. Such assumptions would be consistent with both the re-
cent experience of short-term power markets and with traditional economic
theory[PR01].
Therefore it may seem surprising that we consider instead the hypothesis
that the divergence phenomenon might be attributable merely to random
interactions between myopic agents (i.e., agents who know only about them-
selves) with simple preferences expressed as budget constraints and target
quantities of demand or supply. This hypothesis was inspired by and paral-
lels the work of Gode and Sunder[GS93], who provided a minimal model of
a double-auction market with what they termed “zero-intelligence” agents
(who bid and ask random prices without regard to the state of the mar-
ket or other agents) that produced a price evolution that rapidly converged
to the same equilibrium price as that predicted by the traditional theory
with its assumption of intelligent agents. Certainly their model did include
the one agent endowed with knowledge of the market, i.e., the auctioneer,
who would steer the randomly fluctuating prices towards the equilibrium
by progressively narrowing the range in which the bids and asks would be
accepted. In the markets of interest here, we consider only bilateral trades
without the benefit of a market maker. We discuss below a simple modifica-
tion of the original zero-intelligence assumptions that produce the divergence
phenomenon in a bilateral market of myopic agents.
2 Description of the model
We assumed that the market consisted of non-cooperative agents who traded
bilaterally without the supervision of or input from a market maker. In the
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Figure 1: Schematic of contracted price as a function of time to deliver
power, from [Sta01].
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following paragraphs we describe the agents, the initial conditions, and the
transaction rules of this model market. All of the quantities, budgets, or
prices were taken to be unitless. The differences between this model and
the classical Edgeworth-box trading paradigm are discussed in the conclu-
sion of this section. The principal differences between our myopic agent and
the classical zero-intelligence agent[GS93] is that our agent possesses multi-
ple units of quantity and that its preferences are expressed through budget
constraints rather than with fixed costs or values. We emphasize that this
minimal model does not provide, e.g., a real-time simulation of the trans-
action dynamics of an actual short-term power market (for which we lack
the data in any case); instead, we employed it to test hypotheses about the
information agents require in order to obtain the important features of such
a market.
For each trading session we divided the agents intoNB buyers andNS sellers.
No agent could change roles. Each agent was endowed with multiple units of
integer quantity (supply or demand, see Appendix B) chosen randomly from
a discrete distribution; the lower bound on the distribution of the quantity
was much larger than unity. We also endowed each agent with an initial
budget B0 chosen randomly from a continuous distribution. The buyer’s
budget was the amount she could spend to acquire her initial demand D0.
The seller’s budget was the amount that he was required to recover from
the sale of his initial supply S0. In contrast to the buyer, his budget was
allowed to become negative; in that regime, all sales would contribute to
profit beyond his revenue target. Each agent always knew its own quantity
and budget but knew nothing about the budget or quantity of the other
agents. Buyers left the market if their demand was met or if their budget
was spent (i.e., they were not allowed to accumulate debt). Sellers left the
market only if their supply sold out.
The initial budget distribution was characterized by an initial aggregate
price elasticity parameter c (see Appendix B), which was selected so that
the resulting initial budget-quantity curves could appear to be strongly ex-
ponential and inelastic (case EXP) or nearly linear and more elastic (case
LIN) where they intersected. We considered these two extreme cases, even
though case EXP seems to us to be the more realistic, because we were
interested in the sensitivity of the results to different initial conditions. Fig-
ure2 shows typical supply-demand curves for the initial conditions, where
for each agent its initial value or cost would be interpreted as its B0D0 or its
B0
S0
, respectively. We stress that the curves in Figure 2 applied only to the
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initial conditions because we employed budget constraints rather than value
or cost to determine the agent’s maximum willingness to pay at any moment;
therefore the intersection is not meant to predict the mean price.
It was not necessary in this model for all buyers to meet their demand but
it was convenient both for realism and reproducibility; alternative initial
conditions that led to some buyers failing to meet their demand did not
qualitatively change any of the results presented below. It was enough for
us to assume a 5% excess total supply in order to ensure that all buyers
in all trading sessions met their demand, i.e., none left the market because
their budgets expired first. Therefore only 5% of the sellers failed to sell
all of their supply (consistent with our choices for supply and demand) and
only 3% failed to meet their revenue goals (expressed in their budget) in all
the trading sessions.
The budget constraints in conjunction with an agent’s initial endowment of
multiple units of quantity played a central role in these bilateral transactions.
Each transaction began by randomly selecting a buyer and a seller from
those remaining in the market. The buyer entered her bid and the seller
entered his ask for exactly one unit of power, independently of each other,
as follows. The buyer bid a random number drawn uniformly from the
interval (0, BD ], where B was her remaining budget and D was her remaining
demand. The seller’s ask was determined from one of two cases: For a
positive budget, the seller’s ask would be a random number drawn uniformly
from the interval [BS , B], where B was his remaining budget and S was his
remaining supply; otherwise, because we allowed negative seller budgets, he
would ask a random number drawn uniformly from the interval (0, B0S0 ]. If
the seller’s budget were positive but he had only one unit of supply left, his
ask would become exactly B; we chose budgets so that this case almost never
occurred in practice. Those few sellers with a positive budget at the end of
the trading session were almost always those with many more than one unit
remaining unsold. Both of these choices for constructing bids or asks were
conservative compared to the alternative (for the buyer) of bidding up to her
entire budget for one unit or (for the seller) of always asking between zero
and his whole budget. That alternative would result in some buyers failing
to meet their demand and more sellers failing to meet their revenue goals
but it would not qualitatively change the results presented below. (Another
alternative would strongly impact the results, i.e., expressing the agent’s
preferences with fixed value or cost regardless of budget[GS93]. We note
that in the case each agent is endowed with exactly one unit of quantity
the budget constraint is also equivalent to fixed value or cost; nevertheless,
5
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Figure 2: Supply-demand curves of the agent’s initial conditions for a typical
trading session. See Appendix B for the parameters. The linear curves (case
LIN) are the most elastic where the two curves intersect; the exponential
curves (case EXP) are also the least elastic at the intersection.
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whether the agents are endowed with one or many units, that alternative
would not produce the funnel-shaped price divergence anticipated in Figure
1.)
The transaction succeeded if and only if the buyer’s bid exceeded the seller’s
ask. In that case, the sales price was determined by randomly distributing
the surplus between the buyer and seller according to
price = (bid− ask) ∗ κ+ ask
with κ selected uniformly randomly on the unit interval (alternatively, one
could have fixed κ anywhere on the unit interval without qualitatively chang-
ing the results presented below). Furthermore, each agent’s budget was re-
duced by the sales price and each agent’s quantity would be reduced by
one unit. The offers were presented as “take it or leave it”, so that if the
transaction failed, there would be no subsequent negotiation. No agent em-
ployed the history of bids or asks to calculate future bids or asks. There
was no restriction on or charges for the number of transactions that were
attempted; instead, buyers and sellers continued to be randomly paired until
either there were no buyers left or no sellers left (it turned out that there
were always sellers left because the buyers always met their demands with
the parameters specified in B). A particular buyer-seller pair could be drawn
randomly more than once because agents were sampled (with replacement)
until an agent was removed from the market. Transactions that were agreed
upon were assumed to be feasible and free from transmission charges.
Each attempted transaction, regardless of outcome, counted as one unitless
step in the trading session. The step plays the role of time only in the sense
of imposing an ordering on the transactions. In a real short-term power
market, both buyers and sellers are in a race against the clock. Here, the
trading session was allowed to run as long as there was both supply and
demand. Therefore the time pressure on the agents manifested itself ex-
clusively through the shrinking supply and demand; agents were not given
clocks and could infer “time” only from their remaining budget and quan-
tity.
This model differs from the classical Edgeworth-box trading paradigm[PR01]
in three key ways: (i) we abandoned the classical concept of bi-modal traders
by instead fixing an agent as either a buyer or a seller (ii) we imposed a more
restrictive specification of trading preferences (iii) we allowed at most one
unit of power to be sold per transaction without any restriction on the other
good (money). In the classic two-good trading models without production,
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all traders would be assumed consumers of each good endowed with some
initial quantity. According to their indifference curves, they would attempt
to make a trade which would increase (or at least not decrease) their utility.
There would be no restriction on the number of units sold for each good,
except that they would be feasible according to the agent’s endowments. In
making a trade, there would be no pre-determined buyer or seller; indeed a
trader could switch between buying and selling as necessary to increase his
utility.
Nevertheless, we imposed a more rigid structure for our model. Buyers were
identified and given a target quantity to buy; once it was obtained they were
satisfied (never to buy more) and would not become sellers. Likewise, sellers
were given a target quantity to sell; once the supply was sold, they would
not become a buyer. Thus, we adopted the terms “buyers” or “sellers” to
represent our trader agents since we restricted their behavior accordingly.
This rigid specification of buyer or seller preferences is not usually adopted
in classical economics. Typically preferences exhibit diminishing marginal
utility and local nonsatiation, which were not adopted in this model. Our
buyer was not required to value the last unit of power any less than the
first. As a result, she may have paid a higher price for her last unit of
good than she did for her first. Additionally, “more” is not always “better”
for the buyer, who in our model exits the market once her target demand
is met. Instead of allowing for substitutability between the two goods, we
assumed that buyers were only interested in satisfying their target demand
and sellers were only interested in selling their target supply given their
respective budget and cost constraints. In both cases, these preferences are
consequences of the impossibility of storing bulk power.
3 Results
For each of ten independent trading sessions we initialized two sets of buyers
and sellers, one for each of the two cases EXP and LIN (see Appendix B
for the parameters). In each set, each agent was assigned randomly selected
budgets and quantities. The two cases produced similar results. Fig. 3
shows two typical trajectories of the sales prices for the two cases, respec-
tively. We note immediately the qualitative resemblance of both trajectories
to the funnel shaped curve sketched in Fig. 1 as the prices diverge both up-
ward and downward away from the mean price in the latter part of the
trajectories. The principal differences between the two trajectories are that
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many more transactions were attempted in case LIN to close the market
than in case EXP and that maximum prices in case LIN were lower than
in case EXP. For both trajectories, there was a period for which the prices
fluctuate narrowly, corresponding to an elastic regime for both sellers and
buyers, but the prices began to diverge after about 104 steps, reaching their
most extreme divergence near the end of the session.
Fig. 4 reproduces the typical trajectory for case EXP (but with a linear
price scale) in order to show the typical rise of the maximum price, which
was most dramatic as the market approached its close. We also include in
Figure 4 the running mean sales price and its variance, in order to show how
they track the growth of the maximum price.
The large divergences shown in Figs. 3 and 4, although anticipated (in
fact required for a realistic treatment of this market), complicate the sta-
tistical analysis because the trajectories never settled upon a steady-state
price. Furthermore, the resulting price distributions were far from the nor-
mal, complicating the interpretation of statistics based on higher moments.
We note that the mean sales price (36 for EXP, 35 for LIN) did not vary
much throughout the trajectories despite the large and rapidly growing vari-
ance, which in turn qualitatively tracked the growth of the maximum sales
price.
Fig. 5 shows the superposition of the ten trajectories of the maximum price
of case EXP, along with the change in the maximum price. We also note
that large changes in the maximum price did not begin until after about
the first one-fifth of each trajectory had evolved. The maximum change in
the maximum price for each trajectory (colored in red) occurred with one
exception in the latter third of the trajectories.
The empirical probability functions (i.e., cumulative distribution f functions)
of the sales prices from all ten trajectories are displayed in Fig. 6; the two
cases nearly overlap. We also displayed the empirical probability functions
curves for the New England (NE-ISO) and California (CAL-ISO) sales price
data (in USD/MWh); the NE-ISO data were collected from hourly reports
for all of 1999-2002 and the CAL-ISO data were collected from April 1998
through January 2001. The comparison of the model with the data is prob-
lematic, as we discuss below, because the price data results from hourly
auctions instead of bilateral trades. The S-shaped curve on a semi-log plot
shows that all of the curves in Fig. 6 resemble a log-normal distribution
even though none of the curves strictly fit the log-normal. The probability
distributions displayed in Fig. 6 are fundamental, e.g., they do not require a
9
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Figure 3: Log-log plot of the sales price evolution generated in a typical
trading session for cases EXP and LIN, respectively.
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Figure 4: Sales price evolution of a typical trading session (case EXP), shown
also in Fig. 3, in which the evolution of the maximum price is indicated. The
instantaneous price, the maximum price, the mean price (running mean) are
read on the left-hand axis. The variance (running variance) is read on the
right-hand axis.
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Figure 5: Maximum price evolution of the ten trajectories (i.e., trading
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with triangles.
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prior choice for a bin size. Nevertheless we display the density distribution
function in Fig. 7 (with a unit bin size) because the density may be more
intuitive; in particular it is easier to see that the high price tail behavior is
similar between the models and the data.
4 Discussion and Conclusions
From inspection of the sales price trajectories themselves (Figs. 3 and 4)
and the maximum prices in each of those trajectories (Figs. 4 and 5) we
note that the sales prices diverge in the latter part of the trajectory from
the mean price found in the early part of the trajectories. The elasticity
or inelasticity of the initial conditions (Figure 2) had little to do with the
outcomes of the model or their comparison with data (Fig. 6). With budget
constraints for multiple units of supply or demand, the agents slowly but
persistently adjusted their ability to pay according to their budgets so that
the results were less sensitive to initial conditions with, e.g., preferences
based on fixed values and costs, as in [GS93]. We note that the mean sales
prices corresponding to the cases of elastic (LIN) and inelastic (EXP) initial
conditions are similar to each other and that both are a little larger than the
equilibrium price (about 30) that would be expected from a simple supply-
demand curve analysis of the initial conditions; the increase was due (Fig.
4) almost entirely to the divergence of prices especially in the last third of
the market trajectory.
The comparison to the hourly sales price data is problematic because it
records prices (USD/MWh) from auctions, not short-term bilateral trades;
we would have compared with bilateral trade data if it had been publicly
available. Nevertheless the comparison is useful if for no other reason than to
investigate the sensitivity of price divergence to market structure. First, we
note that the price distribution from data is narrower than the model. This
is expected when using bilateral trading versus auctions[PR01]. Auctions
and bilateral trades are two very different market structures; nevertheless
the behavior in these two structures is similar for high prices. In particular
we note in Fig. 7 that the tail of the price distribution decreases at roughly
the same rate for the model as for the data. We made no attempt to fit or
censor either the data or the results from the model displayed in Figures 6
and 7; in particular, the CAL-ISO data includes prices from intervals when
supply and demand were manipulated[Swe02].
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In our model the price divergence results from, on the one hand, the ability
of some buyers to spend the remaining budget that resulted from making
beneficial trades early in the market in order to obtain increasingly scarce
supply to satisfy their demand and on the other hand, the ability of some
sellers to sell their excess supply cheaply after they had achieved their rev-
enue goals. For both, the preference to either meet their entire demand, or
sell their entire supply motivates each to continue trading even as prices di-
verge. It may be that price divergence is not often observed in other markets
because those agents may be more willing to refrain from trading altogether,
especially if the quantity being traded is storable. Our results suggest that
price divergence is a phenomenon that is insensitive to the details of market
structure and to the knowledge that agents might have about each other
and of the market itself. In conclusion, the price divergences observed in
short-term power markets that might have been due to wide range of causes,
e.g., a deep knowledge of other traders, artifacts of market policies, or clever
strategies by the agents, can also be generated in a model market of myopic
agents with only simple budget constraints and preferences.
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A Appendix: Bilateral trades in real power mar-
kets
The marketing of electric power resources for the purposes of maintaining
system integrity while allowing for profit opportunities beyond the tradi-
tional limits of utility regulation have been in operation in the United States
since the passage of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 and
further enhanced by language in the Energy Policy Act of 1992 encourag-
ing wholesale power competition. Orders[Uni96b, Uni96a] later issued by
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) codified this language
into useable rules. Bilateral contracting among utilities served as one of a
number of useful means for implementing these reforms.
This trend grew in the last decade and a half with the implementation of
market structures (following on the heels of the FERC Orders) which al-
lowed for long-term contracting (typically on a bilateral basis) as well as
short-term “power pool” markets designed for demand-gap-filling, typically
centered on a Locational Marginal Pricing model, where bids to buy and
sell power are settled by a central arbitrating body, and are based on the
locations of supply and demand, transmission capacity constraints, and of-
fered prices. Markets for Ancillary Services (e.g., spinning reserves, reactive
power) have also followed this central arbitration model. The marketing of
electric power and services has evolved from a wide variety of structures
towards a Standardized Market Design (SMD), incorporating these market
elements and others[KM02, Zho03]. We note that the SMD, as well as most
currently developed energy markets, employ a combination of bilateral and
central arbitration structures. This reflects the desire of market designers to
allow for markets to thrive while taking into consideration that the reliable
supply of electric power is paramount. Short-term settlements in a purely
bilateral atmosphere might create opportunities for non-optimal solutions
to the dispatch of power among market participants which, due to physical
constraints of the operating system, could lead to an artificial lessening of
reliability for the participants. The central arbitration structure is designed
so that demand is met in the short term at an equitable level of revenue
or cost to the sellers or buyers, respectively, while ensuring that dispatch is
resolved reliably.
Nonetheless, bilateral transactions serve the dominant share of marketed
electricity[Zho03]. Establishing bilateral transactions, both for the buyer
and seller, minimizes risk. For the seller, the inherent risk is that generation
17
capacity which is unnecessary to meet local demand will go unused, and will
not be needed in shorter-term markets due to market pressures from other
sellers with similar exposures. For the buyer, the risk is that unmet expected
load, while able to be met with available capacity, will be done so only at an
extraordinary premium. For both the buyer and the seller, bilateral transac-
tions minimize the risk that the agreed-to transaction might be subsequently
infeasible because of transmission constraints (e.g., congestion). The price
element of this risk to buyer and seller alike is best expressed in the variance
of the settlement price seen for electric power as a function of the time of
settlement ex ante, as illustrated in Figure 1 above. Contracts placed well
in advance of necessity are much more likely to be established at a value
which has a minimal degree of variance from the long run marginal cost of
operation of the facility (plus a small profit). Contracts placed nearer to the
time of necessity face high variability in general, and engender risk to buyer
and seller alike. Much of this is based on the level of demand relative to
availability at the point of need. In period of low demand relative to supply,
the typical seller will be faced with taking any price, even if at an usually
low price for the period, for the sake of operating the sold capacity. In peri-
ods of high demand relative to supply, buyers are left with two alternatives:
take whatever price is offered, or reduce demand (through planned outages,
customer interruptions, and like actions). This situation can be exacerbated
by the introduction of bidding structures inherent in the market structures
that create the opportunity for high settlement prices[HRO04]. Each of
these transaction behaviors takes place with the full knowledge that most
of the participants, both buyers and sellers, are profit-maximizing entities,
responsible to shareholders, with all of the inherent risks[KM02].
Bilateral contracting of short-term power (within the security requirements
implemented in the designs of existing short-term markets) remains a useful
structure, especially in transactions between and within areas of the North
American power grid which have not yet implemented structures along the
lines of the SMD. Here, little time is left to waste, as agreements must be
negotiated and transmission access rights secured in a limited window of op-
portunity. Many of the markets following many of the aspects of the SMD
have incorporated price caps into the structure; however, for those which
have not (or have placed high cap values), and for those areas following
bilateral practices, documented prices for energy have been seen at extraor-
dinarily high levels, up two orders of magnitude of the price under typical
operating condition, typically for small quantities of power over short peri-
ods of time, necessary to maintain system integrity through times of peak
18
demand[Ind98].
B Appendix: Initialization of the agents
Here we present details of the initialization of the agents. We assigned each
agent’s initial quantity (supply S0 or demand D0) from the nearest integer
of a random variate drawn uniformly from the interval [lo, hi], where lo and
hi are given in Table 1 below. Then we assigned each agent’s budget first by
drawing a random variate X from the continuous probability distribution
F (x), where x is a provisional cost or value, and
F (x) =
exp(−c · lo)− exp(−c · x)
exp(−c · lo)− exp(−c · hi) (1)
with x ∈ [lo, hi]; both x and c are real. The initial budget B0 for each
agent was formed from the product of X and the initial quantity; therefore
the initial cost or value is interpreted as B0D0 or
B0
S0
, respectively. For small
|c|, F is essentially linear, giving rise to linear supply-demand curves (case
LIN); otherwise, the supply-demand curve is essentially exponential (case
EXP). For the choice of parameters listed in Table 1 , supply and demand
for case EXP were inelastic where the supply-demand curves crossed, while
supply and demand for case LIN were much more elastic (see Figure 2) in
the same region. We created 10 sets of agents for each of the two cases,
with NB = 1000 buyers and NS = 500 sellers for each set. Reversing these
numbers gave substantially the same results, as did choosing both to be the
same.
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Table 1: Parameters employed in initializing the agents for the two cases
EXP and LIN (Equation 1).
Quantity EXP LIN
Supply
lo 10 10
hi 100 100
Cost
lo 10 10
hi 200 35
c −0.15 −0.01
Demand
lo 10 10
hi 42 42
Value
lo 5 30
hi 50 50
c 0.2 0.01
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